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In combination, these three factors ensured that the telegraphone would be a commercial failure. This article details the development of the telegraphone and the impact of these factors.
Inventing and Patenting Magnetic Recording
In the late 1890s, Valdemar Poulsen worked in the technical department of the Copenhagen Telephone Company, and also had regular contact with researchers at the Great Northern Telegraph Company.4 Poulsen was familiar with the state of the art in both telegraph and telephone technology, and worked as a troubleshooter. In Hugh Aitken's terminology, Poulsen was a "translator" between the scientific, the technological and the economic sphere, and the Copenhagen Telephone Company was one of those focal points where scientific, technological and economic streams of information came together and so was a logical place for innovations to appear.5
How did Poulsen become interested in magnetic recording? As he explained later, Poulsen was frustrated by the fact that telephone callers were unable to leave a message if the party they called was not at home.6 To say that Poulsen felt that the fate of the telephone current source which fed through an electromagnet. He was able to make short recordings by moving the electromagnet along a piece of piano wire while talking into the microphone. He could then play back the sound by connecting the electromagnet to a telephone earpiece and moving the electromagnet along the wire at the same speed and in the same direction used during the recording process.7 Although crude, the device worked, and Poulsen realized that he had discovered a fundamentally new way of recording sound.8
By the time of his first patent application on 1 December 1898, Poulsen had built a more sophisticated machine that looked much like Edison's first phonograph. It recorded sound, faintly to be sure, but well enough that Poulsen was able to use it to convince Danish patent authorities and financial backers that he had a working 7 Poulsen describes this apparatus in his article "Das Telegraphon" in Annalen der The son of a poor farmer, he revealed exceptional interests and abilities in scientific and technical matters at an early age. In 1889, at the age of 15, he conceived of a new kind of engine that would allow irrigation of his father's dry fields with water from a nearby river. Not knowing whom to ask for advice, he wrote a letter to the king of Denmark on the subject! Even though the machine did not work, the letter nevertheless changed Pedersen's life in a dramatic way. He was given a royal stipend allowing him to commence studies at the Technical University in Copenhagen. During his time there he lived in the house of S.C. Borch, a docent at the university. He was introduced to a number of the people who eventually would have great influence on his life. Among these were Marie Lihme, later to become his first wife, Valdemar Poulsen and S0ren Lemvig Fog. Pedersen graduated from the Technical University with a degree in civil engineering in 1897. In the years from 1899 to sometime around 1920 he collaborated with Valdemar Poulsen on the development of the telegraphone and the Poulsen Arc, an early radio transmitter. In 1909 he became docent at the newly established Institute of Telegraphy and Telephony at the Danish Technical University, 1912 professor at the same institute, and from 1920 until his death in 1941 he was the director of the Technical University. During his lifetime, Pedersen published a large number of scientific articles, mainly on the theory of the Poulsen Arc and on the generation and transmission of radio waves.
12 S0ren Lemvig Fog (1863-1906) was born in Aalborg, Denmark, the son of a customs agent. He originally trained as an officer, but left that career after he authored a series of articles for the Danish newspaper Politiken that were critical of the Army. He went to Brazil some time around 1887. He first set up a match factory, and then invested in a paper mill and various agricultural projects. Fog benefited from the economic boom that followed the establishment of the Brazilian Republic. During the revolutionary period in that country during the early 1890s he turned to the import business, selling war material and railway equipment to the Brazilian government. After making his fortune on a series of large deals (for example, he imported four naval cruisers from Germany to fulfill one contract), he returned to Denmark in the mid-1890s as a wealthy man.
Fog had a reputation for being flashy, especially among other Danish businessmen, since he often gave elaborate parties and always entertained guests in lavish style. He also had a reputation for involving himself with businesses that combined "Danish skill and American smartness." Surviving correspondence shows that Fog saw the telegraphone as a potential example of this sort of business, and that he developed a close personal relationship with Poulsen as a result.
Mark Clark and Henry Nielsen / 10 the firm.l4 Poulsen and Pedersen resigned from their jobs, Poulsen becoming the firm's director and Pedersen the chief engineer. By the end of 1899, the staff was expanded to include one more engineer, E. S. Hagemann, the electrical technician J. P. Christensen, and the skilled machinist E. Liibcke. The latter two individuals were in charge of actually building the experimental apparatus for the three engineers, while Hagemann was an assistant to Pedersen and Poulsen.
The board of Aktieselskabet Telegrafonen soon found that they needed additional help to commercialize the telegraphone. From later events we know that Poulsen, rather optimistically, thought he and his small technical staff could develop the telegraphone into a marketable product, but Lemvig Fog and the rest of the board disliked that idea.15 They had invested in the telegraphone to earn money as quickly as possible, and thus they wanted collaboration with a company that had sufficient technical expertise to offer a speedy development of the telegraphone and that was big enough to market the product over most of Europe. The question was, whether were there any serious Danish candidates for this task. The answer must have been rather obvious to the board, if not to Poulsen and Pedersen: there were none.
Although Denmark was industrializing rapidly around the turn of the century, most Danish firms were still quite small by European standards. Danish industry was primarily oriented towards the domestic market, only about 10 percent of its production being exported in 1897.16 As a result, Denmark, with its small and still primarily agricultural economy, was dependent on foreign countries for most industrial goods and services. It is certainly true that some Danish industrial companies were successful on the international market. Because there were also strong cultural ties between the two countries (most well-educated Danes spoke German and read German books), it was natural that Aktieselskabet Telegrafonen would turn to Germany to find a partner with the expertise to develop and market a commercial product. The partner they selected was the firm of Mix & Genest, a major German manufacturer of telephone and telegraph equipment.20
The In the course of these experiments the team experienced at least one definite success, the discovery that a recording can be substantially improved by means of DC-biasing.24 The discovery was made on 14 or 15 May 1900 during a series of systematic attempts to improve the quality of sound recorded on a new steel tape machine. In each run a brief message was recorded on the tape, then replayed, judged for quality, and finally erased by a strong erasing magnet. Thus the tape was left in a state of maximum transverse polarization (remnant magnetism) before each new run. What Poulsen and Pedersen discovered was that the quality of the recording was substantially improved if the recording magnet was subjected to a DC-current in addition to the signal current from the microphone, the DC-current causing a constant polarization in the opposite direction of the one caused by the erasing magnet. The subject was taken up for further investigation on 28 May 1900, and from the description in the diary it is evident that Pedersen was aware that he and his colleagues had made an important discovery.25 DC-biasing leads to a considerable improvement in sound quality, and was standard in all magnetic recorders until the early 1940s, when it was replaced by the superior AC-bias technique. Poulsen's assistant Hagemann was also involved in his own research on the possibility of using the telegraphone as an amplifier.
Hagemann's amplifier used a drum provided with a series of steel rings having their centers in the axis of the drum and their plane of orientation perpendicular to it (see figure 2). The signal to be amplified is recorded on the first ring as it rotates. The recording is then re-recorded onto the other rings in succession by copying from the first ring. The record on all the rings used to re-record will be the same strength, since the current in each recording electromagnet is the same. In principle, the device would then play back all of the recordings simultaneously into the same circuit, producing a current identical to but stronger than the original input signal, provided the number of rings is sufficiently large.26 In practice, however, each additional added signal adds noise as well as volume. Moreover, any slight misalignment of the playback coils meant that the components of the output signal would be out of phase with one another, adding more noise. As a result, the signal-to-noise ratio quickly increases to the point where the output, though louder, can no longer be understood. This problem was not immediately apparent, however, and when the telegraphone was demonstrated in Paris, both DC-bias and amplifier existed at the time (the vacuum tube was still some years away), so any invention related to telephone amplification was hailed as a potential breakthrough. It appears that the telegraphone amplifier concept, which was not actually demonstrated at the exhibition, accounted for a good deal of the extensive press coverage. This is most clearly seen in the fact that, when subsequent tests showed that Hagemann's idea was unworkable as an amplifier, the interest of the technical journals in the telegraphone declined markedly.
Conflict in Germany
After returning from Paris, the researchers turned to developing a commercial machine. The primary focus was on improving the circuitry used to connect the telegraphone to the telephone network. The conflict between the Danes and the Germans arose from the divergent views they held about how to reach the goal of a commercial machine. Poulsen and Pedersen felt that considerable basic research work remained to be done before the telegraphone would be ready for service under field conditions. Managers at Mix & Genest, on the other hand, wanted a commercial product as soon as possible, and were unwilling to spend money on further work unrelated to producing a marketable machine. This conflict had not surfaced before, because the two firms had concentrated on building an apparatus for exhibit in Paris. Once that task was complete, Mix & Genest immediately gave their highest priority to the recording and playback of real telephone conversations. The technicians of the firm had done work along these lines since Pedersen's departure from Berlin, but without positive results.
Poulsen and Pedersen were recalled to Berlin. After examining the German engineer's notes and experimental set-up, the two men explained Mix & Genest's failure as being the result of an overly ambitious and poorly planned series of experiments. Poulsen and Pedersen claimed that they had successfully resolved most of the German's problems in a recent series of experiments that had yielded clear and understandable speech, but they warned Mix & Genest that in the future they did not want to be associated with experiments that they had not developed themselves. 
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A New Danish Strategy
Since the technological world view of the leaders of Aktieselskabet Telegrafonen was strongly dominated by a telephone frame of meaning, the network of patents, technical experts, investors, economic advisors, and foreign collaborators which was set up to explore the invention was molded by telephone ways of thinking. The effort was focused on producing a product suitable for use within a telephone system. Not surprisingly, the network proved to be fragile when it turned out to be much more difficult to develop a reliable telephone answering machine than had been imagined. Moreover, Hagemann's telephone amplifier concept, which in the beginning created a wave of optimism, also proved unworkable. These failures caused the collapse of the Danish development network; the German collaborators withdrew, and the Danes were left alone again.
The According to its basic principle the telegraphone seems destined to find its place in large administrative departments with the purpose of recording telephone conversations, in small offices it should also be very useful for leaving and receiving messages when nobody is present.... As the telephone companies of various countries tend to be rather different, technically as well as with respect to service, it is usually not possible to use the same type of telegraphone everywhere; certain changes in the electrical circuit and in the mechanical releasing mechanism will be necessary. Therefore I believe that the applications of the telegraphone outside telephony will come first.38 The Danish production company only manufactured a small number of these machines. Exactly how many telegraphones were built in Denmark to Poulsen's design is unknown, but the number was small, probably fewer than 200.39
The absence of a clear market strategy and the fact that Poulsen and Pedersen had left the magnetic recording field to concentrate on Poulsen's new inventions within wireless telegraphy account in part for this limited production. But the primary reason was that Dansk Telegrafonfabrik-which employed only a handful of people-was never meant to be a factory for any large scale production of telegraphones. It was a precision workshop, set up to manufacture the delicate equipment needed by Poulsen and Pedersen in their increasingly successful work on wireless telegraphy, and-just as important-to improve the bargaining position of the Danes in the ongoing negotiations with American investors. 39 The highest surviving serial number of a telegraphone built by the company is 121, and it is unlikely that many more were built. The machine is in the collection of the Dan- Mark Clark and Henry Nielsen /28 directors had authorized full-scale production the previous December. Without machines to sell, the company had no income. Without income, and lacking further funds, the company was forced to accept a friendly takeover, a move that effectively crippled the firm.
Why did Sands' development effort fail? Two problems were central. First, because the twelve-inch disk was much larger and heavier than the five-inch one, a more powerful motive force than a clockwork drive was needed. As a stopgap, a number of clockwork drive recorders were built with 10-inch disks, but these proved to be only a minimal improvement over the Danish machines in terms of recording time. An electric motor was substituted for the clockwork drive in the 12-inch unit, requiring considerable redesign. A major problem was that, unlike the clockwork drive, the electric motor generated electrical interference. After the interference problem was dealt with, a more serious one arose. The manufacture of 12-inch disks proved to be much more difficult than anticipated. In order for the steel to function properly as a magnetic recording medium, the disk had to be heat-treated after manufacture. The 12-inch disks, unlike their smaller counterparts, warped to a considerable extent during this treatment, rendering them unusable. After some experimentation, Sands determined that placing the disks under pressure from a press while they cooled prevented the warping, but this intermediate step raised the cost of manufacture and delayed production, since a suitable press had to be obtained.53
The disk machine Sands eventually developed was essentially unmarketable. It had a recording time of only two minutes per side, four minutes total per disk, and would have sold for $300. A contemporary phonograph could record for about the same length of time, and cost only $70.54 Given the disk recorder's poor price-toperformance ratio, it is not surprising that no more than one hundred were ever built, and there is no evidence that any of them entered commercial service.55 One month later, Rood sent a letter confirming his offer, on 9 July 1908, and the board decided to enter into a contract with him. The contract obligated Rood to purchase 94,300 shares of stock over the years from the company treasury for $2.00 per share (nominal value was $10.00 per share). In return for the discount on the stock price, Rood was to furnish his commercial expertise to the company and become general manager. The contract was signed on 30 July 1908, and Rood was elected president. He became general manager as well the following January.
Rood's takeover of the management of American Telegraphone fundamentally changed the company. His management style was completely different from that of the previous group of investors. In contrast to his predecessors, who had controlled the company by issuing orders based on decisions voted on at board meetings, Rood made decisions by himself. He did not even convene regular board meetings, a practice that led to the resignation of most of the surviving board members less than two years later.58 Rood replaced them with board members he controlled. Subsequent meetings of the board became perfunctory affairs, in marked contrast to earlier prac- The chronic shortage of capital, present throughout the company's history except for a brief period during 1906 and 1907 when Fankhauser was having his greatest success at selling stock, derived from a number of factors. After placing his initial offering, Fankhauser was unable to continue selling shares at the same rate. One of the brokerage firms that he sold to, the Sterling Debenture Company, went out of business in 1907 after its owners were convicted of fraud. By late 1907, Fankhauser was in default on a number of agreements with American Telegraphone and he had to return a considerable amount of unsold stock. During that same year, an expose in Success Magazine gave considerable publicity to 59 An examination of the minute book of the corporation, preserved as part of the "Equity Cause" collection, shows this pattern clearly. Prior to Rood's takeover, meetings are regular, all board members are present, and there are extensive notes detailing the decisions made by the board. Notes for a single meeting often run for several pages. In contrast, under Rood's control, the meetings mandated by the bylaws of the corporation were skipped, there was often no discussion, notes are short, and only one or two of the board members actually attended. wealth was tied up in Hamilton Watch stock. His fellow shareholders bought Rood out over a period of years, so he never had access to his money in one lump sum.
The resulting capital shortage meant that American Telegraphone's workers had to make do with existing machinery and inventory. There were never sufficient funds at any one time to finance a comprehensive effort to improve manufacturing or quality. When Rood assumed control of American Telegraphone, he quickly decided that the disk machine was not a viable design. The telegraphone would never become a success unless it was able to beat the phonograph dictating machine in the market place. What was needed was a machine that could offer some feature existing phonographs did not have. Rood felt that the most logical one to offer was longer recording time. Consequently the development efforts had to start from the Danish wire machine, not the disk machine.
After abandoning the disk machine, Rood pursued a parallel strategy of internal and external development in trying to develop a viable wire recorder. Sands had done some work on the Danish wire telegraphone while he was developing the 12-inch disk model. Rood 64 The spelling Harve is correct-it appears on numerous documents in the Equity Cause records.
